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IV

 As the Court observes at the outset of its opinion, there
is reason to believe that respondent participated in an
especially brutal murder of an American law enforcement agent.
That fact, if true, may explain the Executive's intense interest
in punishing respondent in our courts. [48] Such an explanation,
however, provides no justification for disregarding the Rule of
Law that this Court has a duty to uphold. [49] That the Executive
may wish to reinterpret [50] the Treaty to allow for an action

that the Treaty in no way authorizes should not influence this
Court's interpretation. [51] Indeed, the desire for revenge
exerts "a kind of hydraulic pressure . . . before which even well
settled principles of law will bend," Northern Securities Co.  v.
United States, 193 U. S.  197, 401 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting), but it is precisely at such moments that we should
remember and be guided by our duty "to render judgment evenly and
dispassionately according to law, as each is given understanding
to ascertain and apply it." United States v. Mine Workers, 330
U.S. 258, 342 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).  The way that we
perform that duty in a case of this kind sets an example that
other tribunals in other countries are sure to emulate.

 The significance of this Court's precedents is
illustrated by a recent decision of the Court of Appeal of the
Republic of South Africa.  Based largely on its understanding of
the import of this Court's cases-including our decision in Ker v.
Illinois-that court held that the prosecution of a defendant
kidnaped by agents of South Africa in another country must be
dismissed.  S v.  Ebrahim, S. Afr.  L.  Rep.  (Apr.-June 1991).52
The Court of Appeal of South Africa-indeed, I suspect most courts
throughout the civilized world-will be deeply disturbed by the
"monstrous" decision the Court announces today.  For every Nation
that has an interest in preserving the Rule of Law is affected,
directly or indirectly, by a decision of this character. [53] As
Thomas Paine warned, an "avidity to punish is always dangerous to
liberty" because it leads a Nation "to stretch, to misinterpret,
and to misapply even the best of laws." [54] To counter that
tendency, he reminds us:

"He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even
his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he
establishes a precedent that will reach to himself." [55]

I respectfully dissent.

NOTES:


 1 Respondent is charged in a sixth superseding indictment
with:  conspiracy to commit violent acts in furtherance of
racketeering activity (in violation of 18 U. S. C.  371, 1959);
committing violent acts in furtherance of racketeering
activity (in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1959 (a)(2)); conspiracy to
kidnap a federal agent (in violation of 18 U.S. C. 1201(a)(5),
1201(c)); kidnap of a federal agent (in violation of 18 U. S. C.
1201(a)(5)); and felony murder of a federal agent (in violation
of 18 U. S. C.  1111(a), 1114).  App. 12-32.

 2 Apparently, DEA officials had attempted to gain
respondent's presence in the United States through informal
negotiations with Mexican officials, but were unsuccessful.  DEA
officials then, through a contact in Mexico, offered to pay a
reward and expenses in return for the delivery of respondent to
the United States.  United States v.  Caro-Quintero, 745 F.
Supp. 599, 602-604 (CD Cal. 1990).

 3 Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez was also indicted for the
murder of agent Camarena.  In an earlier decision, we held that
the Fourth Amendment did not apply to a search by United States
agents of Verdugo-Urquidez' home in Mexico.  United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259 (1990).

 4 The Court of Appeals remanded for an evidentiary
hearing as to whether Verdugo's abduction had been authorized by
authorities in the United States.  United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.  2d 1341, 1362 (CA9 1991).

 5 Justice Gray, concurring, would have rested the
decision on the basis of these acts of Congress alone.  Rauscher,
119 U. S., at 433.  Chief Justice Waite dissented, concluding
that the treaty did not forbid trial on a charge other than that
on which

        6 Although the opinion does not explain why the messenger
failed to present the warrant to the proper authorities,
commentators have suggested that the seizure of Ker in the
aftermath of a revolution in Peru provided the messenger with no
"proper authorities" to whom the warrant could be presented.  See
Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 Geo. L.
J.1441, 1451 (1988).

 7 In the words of Justice Miller, the "treaty was not
called into operation, was not relied upon, was not made the
pretext of arrest, and the facts show that it was a clear case of
kidnapping within the dominions of Peru, without any pretence of
authority under the treaty or from the government of the United
States." Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 430, at 443 (1886). Two cases
decided during the Prohibition Era in this country have dealt
with seizures claimed to have been in violation of a treaty
entered into between the United States and Great Britain to
assist the United States in off-shore enforcement of its
prohibition laws, and to allow British passenger ships to carry
liquor while in the waters of the United States.  43 Stat. 1761
(1924).  The history of the negotiations leading to the treaty is
set forth in Cook v.  United States, 288 U. S. 102, 111-118
(1933).  In that case we held that the treaty provision for
seizure of British vessels operating beyond the three-mile limit
was intended to be exclusive, and that therefore liquor seized
from a British vessel in violation of the treaty could not form
the basis of a conviction.

 8 We have applied Ker to numerous cases where the
presence of the defendant was obtained by an interstate
abduction.  See, e.g., Mahon v. Justice, 127 U. S. 700 (1888);
Cook v.  Hart, 146 U.S. 183 (1892); Pettibone v.  Nichols, 203 U.
S.  192, 215-216 (1906).

 9 Ker also was not a national of Peru, whereas respondent
is a national of the country from which he was abducted.
Respondent finds this difference to be immaterial.  Tr. of Oral
Arg. 26

 10 This interpretation is supported by the second clause
of Article 22 which provides that ``[r]equests for extradition
that are under process on the date of the entry into force of
this Treaty, shall be resolved in accordance with the provisions
of the Treaty of 22 February, 1899, . . .'' Extradition Treaty,
May 4, 1978, [1979] United States-United Mexican States, 31 U. S.
T.  5059, 5074, T.I.A.S. No. 9656.

 11 In correspondence between the United States and Mexico
growing out of the 1905 Martinez incident, in which a Mexican
national was abducted from Mexico and brought to the United
States for trial, the Mexican charg wrote to the Secretary of
State protesting that as Martinez' arrest was made outside of the
procedures established in the extradition treaty, "the action
pending against the man can not rest [on] any legal foundation."
Letter of Balbino Davalos to Secretary of State reprinted in
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States,
H.R. Doc.  No. 1, 59th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.  2, p.1121 (1906).
The Secretary of State responded that the exact issue raised by
the Martinez incident had been decided by Ker, and that the
remedy open to the Mexican government, namely a request to the
United States for extradition of Martinez' abductor had been
granted by the United States.  Letter of Robert Bacon to Mexican
Charge, reprinted in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of
the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 1, 59th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2,
at 1121-1122 (1906).

 Respondent and the Court of Appeals stress a statement
made in 1881 by Secretary of State James Blaine to the governor
of Texas to the effect that the extradition treaty in its form at
that time did not authorize unconsented to abductions from
Mexico.  Verdugo, 939 F.  2d, at 1354; Brief for Respondent 14.
This misses the mark, however, for the Government's argument is
not that the Treaty authorizes the abduction of respondent; but
that the Treaty does not prohibit the abduction.

 12 The parties did expressly include the doctrine of
specialty in Article 17 of the Treaty, notwithstanding the
judicial recognition of it in Rauscher.  31 U. S. T., at
5071-5072.

 13 In Article 16 of the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction
with Respect to Crime, the Advisory Committee of the Research in
International Law proposed:

"In exercising jurisdiction under this Convention, no State shall
prosecute or punish any person who has been brought within its
territory or a place subject to its authority by recourse to
measures in violation of international law or international
convention without first obtaining the consent of the State or
States whose rights have been violated by such measures." Harvard
Research in International Law, 29 Am. J.  Int'l L. 442 (Supp.
1935).

 14 Similarly, the Court of Appeals in Verdugo reasoned
that international abductions violate the "purpose" of the
Treaty, stating that "[t]he requirements extradition treaties
impose constitute a means of safeguarding the sovereignty of the
signatory nations, as well as ensuring the fair treatment of
individuals." 939 F.  2d, at 1350.  The ambitious purpose
ascribed to the Treaty by the Court of Appeals, we believe,
places a greater burden on its language and history than they can
logically bear.  In a broad sense, most international agreements
have the common purpose of safeguarding the sovereignty of
signatory nations, in that they seek to further peaceful
relations between nations.  This, however, does not mean that the
violation of any principle of international law constitutes a
violation of this particular treaty.

 15 In the same category are the examples cited by
respondent in which, after a forcible international abduction,
the offended nation protested the abduction, and the abducting
nation then returned the individual to the protesting nation.
Brief for Respondent 18, citing, inter alia, 1 Bassiouni,
International Extradition: United States Law and Practice, 5.4,
pp. 235-237 (2d rev. ed. 1987).  These may show the practice of
nations under customary international law, but they are of little
aid in construing the terms of an extradition treaty, or the
authority of a court to later try an individual who has been so
abducted.  More to the point for our purposes are cases such as
The Ship Richmond, 9 Cranch 102 (1815), and The Merino, 9 Wheat.
391 (1824), both of which hold that a seizure of a vessel in
violation of international law does not affect the jurisdiction
of a United States court to adjudicate rights in connection with
the vessel.  These cases are discussed, and distinguished, in
Cook v. United States, 288 U. S., at 122.

 16 The Mexican government has also requested from the
United States the extradition of two individuals it suspects of
having abducted respondent in Mexico, on charges of kidnapping.
App.  39-66.

 The advantage of the diplomatic approach to the resolution of
difficulties between two sovereign nations, as opposed to
unilateral action by the courts of one nation, is illustrated by
the history of the negotiations leading to the treaty discussed
in Cook v.  United States, supra.  The United States was
interested in being able to search British vessels which hovered
beyond the 3-mile limit and served as supply ships for motor
launches which took intoxicating liquor from them into ports for
further distribution in violation of prohibition laws.  The
United States initially proposed that both nations agree to
searches of the other's vessels beyond the 3-mile limit; Great
Britain rejected such an approach, since it had no prohibition
laws and therefore no problem with United States vessels hovering
just beyond its territorial waters.  The parties appeared to be
at loggerheads; then this Court decided Cunard Steamship Co. v.
Mellon, 262 U. S.  100 (1923), holding that our prohibition laws
applied to foreign merchant vessels as well as domestic within
the territorial waters of the United States, and that therefore
the carrying of intoxicating liquors by foreign passenger ships
violated those laws.  A treaty was then successfully negotiated
giving the United States the right to seizure beyond the 3-mile
limit (which it desired), and giving British passenger ships the
right to bring liquor into United States waters so long as the
liquor supply was sealed while in those waters (which Great
Britain desired).  Cook v. United States, supra.

 17 The abduction of respondent occurred on April 2, 1990.
United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 603 (CD Cal.
1990).  Mexico responded quickly and unequivocally.  Tr. of Oral
Arg. 33; Brief for Respondent 3.  On April 18, 1990, Mexico
requested an official report on the role of the United States in
the abduction, and on May 16, 1990 and July 19, 1990, it sent
diplomatic notes of protest from the Embassy of Mexico to the
United States Department of State.  See Brief for United Mexican
States as Amicus Curiae (Mexican Amicus) 5-6; App.  to Mexican
Amicus 1a-24a.  In the May 16th note, Mexico said that it
believed that the abduction was "carried out with the knowledge
of persons working for the U. S. government, in violation of the
procedure established in the extradition treaty in force between
the two countries," App. to Mexican Amicus 5a, and in the July
19th note, it requested the provisional arrest and extradition of
the law enforcement agents allegedly involved in the
abduction.Id., at 9a-15a.

 18 Mexico has already tried a number of members involved
in the conspiracy that resulted in the murder of the DEA agent.
For example, Rafael Caro-Quintero, a co-conspirator of Alvarez-
Machain in this case, has already been imprisoned in Mexico on a
40-year sentence.  See Brief for Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights as Amicus Curiae 4.

 19 App. 72-87.

 20 Id., at 72.  In construing a treaty, the Court has the
"responsibility to give the specific words of the treaty a
meaning consistent with the shared expectations of the
contracting parties." Air France v. Saks, 470 U. S.  392, 399
(1985).  It is difficult to see how an interpretation that
encourages unilateral action could foster cooperation and mutual
assistance-the stated goals of the Treaty.  See also Presidential
Letter of Transmittal attached to Senate Advice and Consent 3
(Treaty would "make a significant contribution to international
cooperation in law enforcement").

 Extradition treaties prevent international conflict by
providing agreed-upon standards so that the parties may cooperate
and avoid retaliatory invasions of territorial sovereignty.
According to one writer, before extradition treaties became
common, European States often granted asylum to fugitives from
other States, with the result that "a sovereign could enforce the
return of fugitives only by force of arms . . . . Extradition as
an inducement to peaceful relations and friendly cooperation
between states remained of little practical significance until
after World War I." M. Bassiouni, International Extradition and
World Public Order 6 (1974).  This same writer explained that
such treaties further the purpose of international law, which is
"designed to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
states, and [to] restrict impermissible state conduct." 1 M.
Bassiouni, International Extradition:  United States Law and
Practice Ch. 5, 2, p. 194 (2d rev. ed. 1987).

 The object of reducing conflict by promoting cooperation
explains why extradition treaties do not prohibit informal
consensual delivery of fugitives, but why they do prohibit state-
sponsored abductions.  See Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations (Restatement) 432, and Comments a-c (1987).

 21 App. 72-74 (Articles 2 and 4).

 22 Id., at 73, 75, 76-79 (Articles 3, 7, 10, 12, and 13).

 23 Id., at 74-75 (Articles 5 and 8).

 24 Id., at 83, 73.

 25 Id., at 76.

 26 The Court resorts to the same method of analysis as
did the dissent in United States v.  Rauscher, 119 U. S.  407
(1886).  Chief Justice Waite would only recognize an explicit
provision, and in the absence of one, he concluded that the
Treaty did not require that a person be tried only for the
offense for which he had been extradited:  "The treaty requires a
delivery up to justice, on demand, of those accused of certain
crimes, but says nothing about what shall be done with them after
the delivery has been made.  It might have provided that they
should not be tried for any other offences than those for which
they were surrendered, but it has not." Id., at 434.  That
approach was rejected by the Court in Rauscher, and should also
be rejected by the Court here.

 27 To make the point more starkly, the Court has, in
effect, written into Article 9 a new provision, which says:
"Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, either
Contracting Party can, without the consent of the other, abduct
nationals from the territory of one Party to be tried in the
territory of the other."

 28 It is ironic that the United States has attempted to
justify its unilateral action based on the kidnaping, torture,
and murder of a federal agent by authorizing the kidnaping of
respondent, for which the American law enforcement agents who
participated have now been charged by Mexico.  See App.  to
Mexican Amicus 5a.  This goes to my earlier point, see n. 4,
supra, that extradition treaties promote harmonious relations by
providing for the orderly surrender of a person by one State to
another, and without such treaties, resort to force often
followed.

 29 This Court has previously described a treaty as
generally "in its nature a contract between two nations," Foster
v.  Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314 (1829); see Rauscher, 119 U. S., at
418; it is also in this country the law of the land.  2 Pet., at
314; 119 U. S., at 418-419.

 30 Mexico's understanding is that "[t]he extradition
treaty governs comprehensively the delivery of all persons for
trial in the requesting state `for an offense committed outside
the territory of the requesting Party.'" Brief for United Mexican
States as Amicus Curiae, O.T.  1991, No. 91-670, p. 6.  And
Canada, with whom the United States also shares a large border
and with whom the United States also has an extradition treaty,
understands the treaty to be "the exclusive means for a request-
ing government to obtain . . . a removal" of a person from its
territory, unless a Nation otherwise gives its consent.  Brief
for Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae 4.

 31 The United States has offered no evidence from the
negotiating record, ratification process, or later communications
with Mexico to support the suggestion that a different
understanding with Mexico was reached.  See M.  Bassiouni,
International Extradition:  United States Law and Practice Ch. 2,
 4.3, at p.  82 ("Negotiations, preparatory works, and
diplomatic correspondence are an integral part of th[e]
surrounding circumstances, and [are] often relied on by courts in
ascertaining the intentions of the parties") (footnote omitted).

 32 Article X of the Treaty provided:

 "It is agreed that the United States and Her Britannic
Majesty shall, upon mutual requisitions by them, or their
ministers, officers, or authorities, respectively made, deliver
up to justice all persons who, being charged with the crime of
murder, or assault with intent to commit murder, or piracy, or
arson, or robbery, or forgery, or the utterance of forged paper,
committed within the jurisdiction of either, shall seek an
asylum, or shall be found, within the territories of the other:
provided that this shall only be done upon such evidence of
criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the
fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his
apprehension and commitment for trial, if the crime or offence
had there been committed:  and the respective judges and other
magistrates of the two Governments shall have power,
jurisdiction, and authority, upon complaint made under oath, to
issue a warrant for the apprehension of the fugitive or person so
charged, that he may be brought before such judges or other
magistrates, respectively, to the end that the evidence of
criminality may be heard and considered; and if, on such hearing,
the evidence be deemed sufficient to sustain the charge, it shall
be the duty of the examining judge or magistrate to certify the
same to the proper Executive authority, that a warrant may issue
for the surrender of such fugitive.  The expense of such
apprehension and delivery shall be borne and defrayed by the
party who makes the requisition, and receives the fugitive." 8
Stat. 576.

 33 The doctrine defined by the Court in Rauscher--that a
person can be tried only for the crime for which he had been
extradited-has come to be known as the "doctrine of specialty."

 34 In its opinion, the Court suggests that the result in
Rauscher was dictated by the fact that two federal statutes had
imposed the doctrine of specialty upon extradition treaties.
Ante, at 4.  The two cited statutes, however, do not contain any
language purporting to limit the jurisdiction of the Court;
rather, they merely provide for protection of the accused pending
trial.

 35 In fact, both parties noted in their respective briefs
several authorities that had held that a person could be tried
for an offense other than the one for which he had been
extradited.  See Brief for United States in United States v.
Rauscher, O.T. 1885, No. 1249, pp. 6-10 (citing United States v.
Caldwell, 8 Blatchford 131 (SDNY 1871); United States v.
Lawrence, 13 Blatchford 295 (SDNY 1876); Adriance v. Lagrave, 59
N.Y. 110 (1874)); Brief for Respondent in United States v.
Rauscher, O.T. 1885, No. 1249, pp. 8-16 (same).

 36 This principle is embodied in Article 17 of the
Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr.  30, 1948, 2
U. S.T.  2394, T.I.A.S.  No. 2361, as amended by the Protocol of
Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U. S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847,
as well as numerous provisions of the United Nations Charter,
June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.  1031, T.S.  No. 993 (to which both the
United States and Mexico are signatories).  See generally Mann,
Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Abducted in Breach of
International Law, in International Law at a Time of Perplexity
407 (Y. Dinstein and M. Tabory eds. 1989).

 37 When Abraham Sofaer, Legal Adviser of the State
Department, was questioned at a congressional hearing, he
resisted the notion that such seizures were acceptable:  "`Can
you imagine us going into Paris and seizing some person we regard
as a terrorist . . .?  [H]ow would we feel if some foreign
nation-let us take the United Kingdom-came over here and seized
some terrorist suspect in New York City, or Boston, or
Philadelphia, . . .  because we refused through the normal
channels of international, legal communications, to extradite
that individual?'" Bill To Authorize Prosecution of Terrorists
and Others Who Attack U. S.  Government Employees and Citizens
Abroad:  Hearing before the Subcommittee on Security and
Terrorism of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess., 63 (1985).

 38 Justice Story's opinion continued:
"The arrest of the offending vessel must, therefore, be
restrained to places where our jurisdiction is complete, to our
own waters, or to the ocean, the common highway of all nations.
It is said, that there is a revenue jurisdiction, which is
distinct from the ordinary maritime jurisdiction over waters
within the range of a common shot from our shores.  And the
provisions in the Collection Act of 1799, which authorize a
visitation of vessels within four leagues of our coasts, are
referred to in proof of the assertion.  But where is that right
of visitation to be exercised?  In a foreign territory, in the
exclusive jurisdiction of another sovereign?  Certainly not; for
the very terms of the act confine it to the ocean, where all
nations have a common right, and exercise a common sovereignty.
And over what vessels is this right of visitation to be
exercised?  By the very words of the act, over our own vessels,
and over foreign vessels bound to our ports, and over no others.
To have gone beyond this, would have been an usurpation of
exclusive sovereignty on the ocean, and an exercise of an
universal right of search, a right which has never yet been
acknowledged by other nations, and would be resisted by none with
more pertinacity than by the American." The Apollon, 9 Wheat.,
at 371-373.

 39 See Restatement 432, Comment c ("If the unauthorized
action includes abduction of a person, the state from which the
person was abducted may demand return of the person, and
international law requires that he be returned").

 40 Henkin, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind,
25 John Marshall L. J. 215, 231 (1992) (footnote omitted).
41Thus, the Restatement of Foreign Relations states in part:
"(2) A state's law enforcement officers may exercise their
functions in the territory of another state only with the consent
of the other state, given by duly authorized officials of that
state.
 . . . . .
"c.  Consequences of violation of territorial limits of law
enforcement.  If a state's law enforcement officials exercise
their functions in the territory of another state without the
latter's consent, that state is entitled to protest and, in
appropriate cases, to receive reparation from the offending
state.  If the unauthorized action includes abduction of a
person, the state from which the person was abducted may demand
return of the person, and international law requires that he be
returned.  If the state from which the person was abducted does
not demand his return, under the prevailing view the abducting
state may proceed to prosecute him under its laws." Restatement
432, and Comment c.

 42 Just as Rauscher had standing to raise the treaty
violation issue, respondent may raise a comparable issue in this
case.  Certainly, if an individual who is not a party to an
agreement between the United States and another country is
permitted to assert the rights of that country in our courts, as
is true in the specialty cases, then the same rule must apply to
the individual who has been a victim of this country's breach of
an extradition treaty and who wishes to assert the rights of that
country in our courts after that country has already registered
its protest.

 43 "In the international legal order, treaties are
concluded by states against a background of customary
international law.  Norms of customary international law specify
the circumstances in which the failure of one party to fulfill
its treaty obligations will permit the other to rescind the
treaty, retaliate, or take other steps." V zquez, Treaty-Based
Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 301, 375
(1992).

 4 5As the Illinois Supreme Court described the action:
"The arrest and detention of [Ker] was not by any authority of
the general government, and no obligation is implied on the part
of the Federal or any State government . . . .  The invasion of
the sovereignty of Peru, if any wrong was done, was by
individuals, perhaps some of them owing no allegiance to the
United States, and not by the Federal government." Ker v.
Illinois, 110 Ill. 627, 643 (1884).

 46 The Martinez incident discussed by the Court, see
ante, at 9-10, n. 11, also involved an abduction by a private
party; the reference to the Ker precedent was therefore
appropriate in that case.  On the other hand, the letter written
by Secretary of State Blaine to the Governor of Texas in 1881
unequivocally disapproved of abductions by either party to an
extradition treaty.  In 1984, Secretary of State Schultz
expressed the same opinion about an authorized kidnaping of a
Canadian national.  He remarked that, in view of the extradition
treaty between the United States and Canada, it was
understandable that Canada was "outraged" by the kidnaping and
considered it to be "a violation of the treaty and of
international law, as well as an affront to its sovereignty." See
Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 78 Am. J. Int'l L. 200, 208 (1984).

 47 Article 16 of the Draft provides:

"In exercising jurisdiction under this Convention, no State shall
prosecute or punish any person who has been brought within its
territory or a place subject to its authority by recourse to
measures in violation of international law or international
convention without first obtaining the consent of the State or
States whose rights have been violated by such measures." Harvard
Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction
with Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. Int'l L. 435, 623 (Supp. 1935).

 48 See, e.g., Storm Arises Over Camarena; U. S.  Wants
Harder Line Adopted, Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Mar.  8, 1985, p. 10;
U. S.  Presses Mexico To Find Agent, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 20,
1985, p.  10.

 49 As Justice Brandeis so wisely urged:
"In a government of laws, existence of the government will be
imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously.  Our
Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.  For good or
for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.  Crime is
contagious.  If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself; it invites anarchy.  To declare that in the administra-
tion of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare
that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the
conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible
retribution.  Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should
resolutely set its face." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S.
438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

 50 Certainly, the Executive's view has changed over time.
At one point, the Office of Legal Counsel advised the
Administration that such seizures were contrary to international
law because they compromised the territorial integrity of the
other Nation and were only to be undertaken with the consent of
that Nation.  4B Op. Off.  Legal Counsel 549, 556 (1980).  More
recently, that opinion was revised and the new opinion concluded
that the President did have the authority to override customary
international law.  Hearing before the Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., 1st Sess., 4-5 (1989) (statement of William P. Barr,
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U. S.
Department of Justice).

 51Cf. Perkins v, Elg, 307 U. S. 325 (1939) (construing
treaty in accordance with historical construction and refusing to
defer to change in Executive policy); Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.
S. 309 (1907) (rejecting Executive's interpretation).

 52 The South African court agreed with appellant that an
"abduction represents a violation of the applicable rules of
international law, that these rules are part of [South African]
law, and that this violation of the law deprives the Court . . .
of its competence to hear [appellant's] case . . . ." S. Afr. L.
Rep., at 8-9.

 53 As Judge Mansfield presciently observed in a case not
unlike the one before us today:  "Society is the ultimate loser
when, in order to convict the guilty, it uses methods that lead
to decreased respect for the law." United States v. Toscanino,
500 F. 2d 267, 274 (CA2 1974).

 54 2 The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine 588 (P.  Foner
ed.  1945).

 55 Ibid.